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1 Introduction
In “Perceptual Variation and Relativism” (forthcoming b) I criticized two
proposals for combining perceptual relativism with perceptual atomism. Both
proposals are atomistic in that they explain, in atomistic fashion, how we
manage to perceive the colors of objects. Both proposals are relativistic in
that they imply, in accordance with relativism, that two people can per-
ceive an object’s color even if their perceptions have different phenomenal
characters. For concreteness, I focused on a particular perception, namely
your perception of a shaded region on a certain sphere’s surface (see Figure
1). Both proposals agree that you perceive that region’s color because of
a causal relation between the shaded region and the phenomenal character
of your perception, namely phenomenal-dark-grayness. But they disagree
about which properties of the shaded region are its colors, and thus about
which property you’re perceiving.
Proposal 1a: While the shaded region causes a phenomenal-dark-gray
perception in you, you perceive the shaded region as instantiating
causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me in this context.
Proposal 2a: While the shaded region causes a phenomenal-dark-gray
perception in you, you perceive the shaded region as instantiating what-
ever property satisfies the description: the property that disposes the
shaded region to cause phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me in this
context.
In “Perceptual Variation and Relativism” I argued that these proposals make
it difficult, if not impossible, to explain color inaccuracy and color constancy.
It’s therefore natural to wonder about the alternatives. In this appendix I’ll
consider the most plausible alternatives. They differ from the proposals
above in that they appeal to other phenomenal characters (Sect 2), other
properties of perceptions (Sect 3), other perceivers (Sect 4), other contexts
(Sect 5), or other relations (Sect 6). I will argue that either these alternatives
don’t help explain color inaccuracy and color constancy, or they have other,
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Figure 1: Color constancy
more serious drawbacks. I’ll conclude that perceptual relativism shouldn’t
be combined with perceptual atomism.
2 Other Phenomenal Characters
Your perceptions of different regions on the sphere’s surface have differ-
ent phenomenal characters, such as phenomenal-dark-gray and phenomenal-
medium-gray. Chalmers (2006, p.86–91) suggests that there’s a respect in
which all of these phenomenal characters are the same. In particular, he
suggests that, because you perceive each region as the same shade of white
(let’s call it ‘white7’), all of these phenomenal characters involve the phe-
nomenal character associated with perceiving that shade of white (let’s call
it ‘phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7’). More generally, Chalmers suggests
that, if you perceive an object as a certain color, your perception has a cer-
tain phenomenal character, independent of how you perceive that object’s
illumination (see also Hilbert 2005, p.151).
What is the relation between phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7 and the
other phenomenal characters of your perceptions, such as phenomenal-dark-
grayness and phenomenal-medium-grayness? There’s room for a number of
different views. One possibility is that phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7
is a part of these other phenomenal characters. Another possibility is that
phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7 is a determinable of these other phenome-
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nal characters. Yet another possibility is that phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7
is an additional character, above and beyond these other phenomenal char-
acters, in that it can exist without them, and vice versa. There are other
possibilities, but, for our purposes, these possibilities will be sufficiently rep-
resentative.
Chalmers suggests that phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7, rather than
phenomenal-dark-gray, is the relevant phenomenal character.1 This yields
two alternative proposals:
Proposal 1b: While the shaded region causes a phenomenal-underlying-
white7 perception in you, you perceive the shaded region as instanti-
ating causes phenomenal-underlying-white7 perceptions in me in this
context.
Proposal 2b: While the shaded region causes a phenomenal-underlying-
white7 perception in you, you perceive the shaded region as instan-
tiating whatever property satisfies the description: the property that
disposes the shaded region to cause phenomenal-underlying-white7 per-
ceptions in me in this context.
Both proposals seem to explain color constancy. Given (1b), you might
perceive the sphere’s color as constant because you perceive all of the re-
gions on the sphere’s surface as instantiating causes phenomenal-underlying-
whiteness7 perceptions in me in this context. Given (2b), you might perceive
the sphere’s color as constant because your perceptions all have the same phe-
nomenal character, namely phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7, rather than
because of which colors you’re perceiving. If it seems strange to explain
color constancy in this second way, it might help to note that proponents
of proposals like (2b), such as McLaughlin (2003, p.111–116), offer parallel
explanations of color similarity. They claim that you perceive objects as sim-
ilar in color because your perceptions have similar phenomenal characters,
rather than because you’re perceiving similar colors.
Given that these proposals seem to explain color constancy, and that
Chalmers’s suggestion is essential to them, it’s a suggestion worth taking
seriously. Nonetheless, I don’t think it withstands scrutiny.
For phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7 to help the atomist, it must be
included in the phenomenal character of your perception of each region,
1Chalmers never endorses this suggestion. He merely says that he is inclined toward it
(2006, p.87).
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whether as a part, determinable, or addition. The atomist wants to ex-
plain your perception of the sphere’s constant color by appealing to your
perceptions of each region’s color, and without appealing to perceptions of
other kinds. Thus, the atomist must appeal to a phenomenal character that’s
included in your perception of each region. This is perhaps easier to appre-
ciate in cases when you’re perceiving several different objects. Suppose you
perceive the tiles in a bathroom as a constant color, despite their uneven
illumination. The atomist wants to explain your perception of the tiles’ con-
stant color by appealing to your perceptions of each tile’s color, and without
appealing to perceptions of other kinds. An atomist must therefore appeal
to a phenomenal character that’s included in your perception of each tile.
More generally, an atomist can’t appeal to global, Gestalt-like phenomenal
characters. She can appeal only to what we might call “local” phenomenal
characters.2
While I agree with Chalmers that there’s more to your phenomenology
than characters like phenomenal-dark-gray and phenomenal-medium-gray, I
don’t think there’s a local phenomenal character that helps the atomist. To
start, when I introspect, I don’t find what Chalmers describes. Consider
again the squares from the introduction:
I perceive these squares as different colors; this is not an instance of color
constancy. I also don’t perceive either square as white. Thus, if there is
such a thing as phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7, it isn’t included in my
perceptions of these squares. Yet when I then look at the sphere (Figure 1),
there are regions such that my perceptions of those regions have the same
local phenomenal characters as my perceptions of these squares. That is,
there is a region on the sphere’s surface that seems to have exactly the same
phenomenal character as my perception of the square, and likewise for the
2Chalmers makes exactly this point. He considers the view that the color you perceive
at each region depends on your global phenomenology, and says that “this view requires a
certain anti-atomism about perceptual content: the veridicality conditions of an experience
of a color at a location are not determined just by the local phenomenology associated
with the location, but by the phenomenology of the entire visual experience”(2006, p.86).
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right square. This implies that phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7 isn’t in-
cluded in the local phenomenal characters of my perceptions of these regions
of the sphere’s surface, as either a part, a determinable, or an additional
element. For this reason, Chalmers’s suggestion doesn’t seem true to the
phenomenology. While my perception of the sphere has additional phenom-
enal characters, they are more global and Gestalt-like, and thus unhelpful to
the atomist.3
This is similar in spirit to Cohen’s (2008, p.67–69) objection. Cohen
refers to experiments in which subjects create a match between unevenly il-
luminated surfaces by adjusting the hue of one of the surfaces. Cohen infers
that subjects don’t perceive the surface’s color and illumination as separate
elements. He concludes that there aren’t separate phenomenal characters for
color and illumination, and thus that there isn’t a phenomenal character,
such as phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7, that’s constant across changes in
illumination. One advantage of our objection is that we don’t need to worry
that subjects are merely misperceiving the change in hue as a change in illu-
mination, and are thus still perceiving the surface’s hue and illumination as
separate elements. Another advantage of our objection is that we don’t need
to worry that subjects are reporting a match, despite phenomenal differences
(see Hilbert 2005, p.151–152; 2012, p.207). A third advantage of our objec-
tion is that we don’t need to worry that these experiments don’t generalize
from two-dimensional displays to natural scenes (see Gert 2010, p.676–678).
More generally, by relying on first-personal introspection of the phenomenal
characters, rather than on third-personal data about when subjects report a
match between surfaces, we can be more confident that the local phenomenal
characters are the same.
There’s another, related problem with Chalmers’s suggestion. In an ex-
periment that’s standard among color researchers, subjects view surfaces un-
der two different illuminants, and are asked whether they perceive the same
3I think there’s another way of bringing out this problem, internal to Chalmers’s sys-
tem. Chalmers says that when you look at a white object covered by a shadow, the
Edenic content of our perception includes Edenic white and what he calls an “Edenic
shadow”(p.87). But, while I have a grip on what he calls Edenic white, I can’t get a grip
on Edenic shadows. I think this shows that the phenomenal character of our perception
can’t be divided into a shadow component and a color component. Moreover, the alterna-
tive suggestion that you are perceiving a “certain mode” of Edenic white (see again p.87)
seems to merely label the problem without solving it. We’re left wondering: How can
Edenic colors have “modes”?
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color (Figure 2). For example, on the left side of a partition you might view
a surface under a dim illuminant, and on the right side of the partition you
might view a surface under a bright illuminant. Suppose you perceive the
surface on the left as the same color as the surface on the right. If Chalmers’s
suggestion were true, your perceptions of both surfaces would share a phe-
nomenal character. Without loss of generality, let’s suppose it’s phenomenal-
underlying-white7. Suppose we then gradually decrease the illumination of
the right surface. As the illumination decreases, you will probably perceive
the right surface as remaining the same color, despite the change in its il-
lumination, just as you ordinarily perceive surfaces as remaining the same
color despite changes in their illumination, such as when you carry them
outdoors. Thus, if Chalmers’s suggestion were true, your perception of the
right surface would still include phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7, despite
the change in illumination. Your perception of the left surface, meanwhile,
would presumably also still include phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7, given
that its illumination hasn’t changed. Summarizing: your perceptions of both
surfaces are initially phenomenal-underlying-white7, and your perceptions of
both surfaces would still be phenomenal-underlying-white7 after we decrease
the illumination of the right surface until it equals the illumination of the
left surface. Recall that, according to Chalmers’s suggestion, if your percep-
tions of two surfaces are phenomenal-underlying-white7, you perceive them
as the same shade of white, and thus as the same color. Chalmers’s sugges-
tion thereby generates a prediction: that when the illumination of the right
surface decreases enough to equal the illumination of the left surface, you
will still perceive the two surfaces as the same color. But that’s not what
happens: you will perceive the left surface as darker than the right surface.
One of the basic results of lightness research is that, in experiments like this,
subjects perceive a target as the same color as more reflective surfaces under
dimmer illumination, and thus as the same color as surfaces that would look
lighter under equal illumination (see Gilchrist 2006, Ch 10).
Chalmers says that his suggestion merely requires the mechanisms of
color constancy to work “reasonably well”(2006, p.89). But it actually re-
quires those mechanisms to be optimal, in that it requires them to be able
to identify the same reflectance under all normal lighting conditions. Other-
wise, there will be counterexamples like the one I just described, given that
we ordinarily perceive surfaces as remaining the same color despite changes
in their illumination.
I conclude that color constancy isn’t explained by a local phenomenal
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Figure 2: Light and shadow matching experiment, from Gilchrist 2006, p.289
character like phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7. This isn’t to say that your
perception of the sphere doesn’t involve any additional phenomenal charac-
ters. Here’s what I find:
First, I find an additional phenomenal character that accompanies my
perception of the entire sphere as the same color, and which is over and
above the phenomenal characters of my perceptions of each region (for a
related claim, see James 1950, Volume 1, p.495). I find the same phenomenal
character in my perception of shaded apples and lemons, and thus it doesn’t
seem specific to my perception of white objects. It’s a more general feeling of
uniformity. For this reason, it won’t help the atomist explain why I perceive
the ball as white rather than red or yellow, because it isn’t caused only
by white objects. It also won’t help the atomist because it’s too global and
Gestalt-like; it’s over and above the phenomenal characters of my perceptions
of each region.
Second, I find a phenomenal character that accompanies my appreciation
that the sphere is the same color as objects I’ve seen before (for more, see
my forthcoming a, Sec 7.3). That is, there’s a feeling of recognition; I’m
perceiving another instance of a familiar kind of object. As with the phe-
nomenal character I just mentioned, this character is over and above the
phenomenal characters of my perceptions of each region. I also think it’s too
coarse-grained for the perceptual atomist, because I’m appreciating a simi-
larity to a relatively diverse group of objects; I’m just appreciating that the
sphere is the same as objects with the same general shade of white, rather
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Figure 3: Kitaoka’s illusion
than objects with the more specific shade of white that I perceive as coating
the ball’s surface. Therefore, this phenomenal character doesn’t help the
atomist. The atomist wants to explain my perception of the sphere’s more
specific shade, and therefore needs to identify a phenomenal character that’s
unique to my perception of that shade.
It’s also worth mentioning another shortcoming of Chalmers’s suggestion:
it wouldn’t help explain color inaccuracy. Consider again Kitaoka’s illusion
(Figure 3). Atomists are pushed to say that your perceptions of both squares
are accurate, because there doesn’t seem to be any justification for believing
that one perception, rather than the other, is accurate. Chalmers’s sugges-
tion doesn’t help in this regard, because you perceive the left square as darker
than the right square, and thus the phenomenal characters of your percep-
tions can’t be the same in a respect like phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7.
Perhaps your perception of the left square is phenomenal-underlying-gray5
and your perception of the right square is phenomenal-underlying-gray15.
Thus, even if there were such a thing as phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7,
atomists are still pushed to say that both of these perceptions are accurate,
making it hard to explain color inaccuracy.
3 Other Properties
So far, we focused on ways of dividing perceptions according to their phe-
nomenal characters. But this isn’t the only way of dividing perceptions. We
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can also divide them according to other properties, such as their functional
roles and neural realizers, for example.
Let’s start with functional roles. Let’s say your perception of a region
on the left side of the sphere has functional kind left-function and your per-
ception of a region on the right side of the sphere has functional kind right-
function. Perhaps these are the relevant properties of your perceptions. This
would yield two proposals:
Proposal 1c: While the shaded region causes a left-function perception
in you, you perceive the shaded region as instantiating causes left-
function perceptions in me in this context
Proposal 2c: While the shaded region causes a left-function perception
in you, you perceive the shaded region as instantiating whatever prop-
erty satisfies the description: the property that disposes that region to
cause left-function perceptions in me in this context.
These proposals make it difficult to explain color constancy and color in-
accuracy, and for exactly the same reasons as (1a) and (2a). For example,
given (1c), you would perceive each region as a different color. Likewise,
given (2c), there doesn’t seem to be any common element that might explain
the sense in which you perceive the sphere as a constant color. While the
arguments about (1a) and (2a) from Section 4 of “Perceptual Variation and
Relativism” are about phenomenal characters, they apply equally to func-
tional roles. Thus, we should reject (1c) and (2c) for the same reasons we
rejected (1a) and (2a).
Inspired by Chalmers’s suggestion, one might try to identify a functional
role that’s shared by all of our perceptions of the sphere’s surface. Let’s call
it left&right-function. That would yield:
Proposal 1d: While the shaded region causes a left&right-function per-
ception in you, you perceive the shaded region as instantiating causes
left&right-function perceptions in me in this context
Proposal 2d: While the shaded region causes a left&right-function per-
ception in you, you perceive the shaded region as instantiating what-
ever property satisfies the description: the property that disposes that
region to cause left&right-function perceptions in me in this context.
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One problem with these proposals is that, whereas we can use introspection
to determine whether there’s a respect in which the phenomenal characters
of our perceptions are the same, we don’t have the same kind of access to
the functional roles of our perceptions. For this reason, supposing that there
is a respect in which the functions are the same is an empirical conjecture,
and thus a risky bet. For example, it might turn out that the only kind of
functional role shared by these perceptions is also shared by our perceptions
of green, in which case we would perceive white and green objects as the
same color, at least according to these proposals.
But, even setting this problem aside, these proposals wouldn’t explain
color inaccuracy, and for the same reason that Chalmers’s suggestion doesn’t
explain color inaccuracy. In particular, your perceptions of the squares in
Kitaoka’s illusion must not have functions that are the same in the relevant
respect, because you perceive the left square as darker than the right square.
Thus, even if there is such a thing as left&right-function, atomists are still
pushed to say that both perceptions are accurate, and the most natural
explanation is that your perception of a region on the left represents whatever
color is shared by objects that cause perceptions with left-function in that
context, and your perception of a region on the right represents whatever
color is shared by objects that cause perceptions with right-function in that
context. And we’re back into familiar territory, because that quickly leads
to the conclusion that all our perceptions are accurate.
Another possibility is that there’s a functional state, global-function, that’s
over and above our perception of each region, and that suffices for your per-
ceiving the entire sphere as white. But this won’t help an atomist, and for
the same reason that a general feeling of uniformity won’t help the atomist.
In particular, an atomist wants to explain color constancy by first explain-
ing how we perceive the color of each individual region, and thus needs to
identify a functional role that belongs to each of those perceptions.
So far, we considered dividing perceptions by their phenomenal characters
and functional roles. There are other ways of dividing them — for example,
by their underlying neural activity. But we’ve identified a general problem
with appeals to other kinds of perception: If it’s a kind specific to each per-
ception (e.g., phenomenal-dark-gray, left-function), it’s hard to explain color
constancy and color inaccuracy. If it’s a kind shared by your perceptions of
all the regions (e.g., phenomenal-underlying-whiteness7, left&right-function),
it’s unclear there is such a kind, and it won’t help explain color inaccuracy.
And if it’s not a kind shared by your perceptions of all the regions (e.g.,
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Gestalt phenomenal characters, global-function), it doesn’t help the atomist.
4 Other Perceivers
According to all of the proposals we considered, you perceive the color of
the shaded region because of a causal relation involving you. What other
perceiver might one appeal to? It might be helpful to restate this question
more schematically. We’re looking for an alternative way of filling in the
schema:
Proposal 1e: While the shaded region causes a phenomenal-dark-gray
perception in you, you perceive the shaded region as instantiating
causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in in this context
Proposal 2e: While the shaded region causes a phenomenal-dark-gray
perception in you, you perceive the shaded region as instantiating what-
ever property satisfies the description: the property that disposes that
region to cause phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in in this con-
text.
What are our options?
One option is: all normal perceivers. But this is a non-starter, because
the same objects cause perceptions with different phenomenal characters in
different normal perceivers. In our initial example from “Perceptual Varia-
tion and Relativism,” the same stone tile causes perceptions with different
phenomenal characters in Sarah and Jacob. Thus, nothing has the property
causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in all normal perceivers in this con-
text, and nothing satisfies the description: the property that disposes that
region to cause phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in all normal perceivers
in this context. Thus, nobody’s perception of the stone tile would be accu-
rate. But, according to perceptual relativism, Sarah’s and Jacob’s percep-
tions might both be accurate.
Another option is: at least one normal perceiver. An advantage of this
option is that color inaccuracy would be possible. If you are not a normal
perceiver, then you can misperceive the colors of objects. Suppose that when
your perception has a phenomenal-dark-gray character, you perceive the ob-
ject as instantiating causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in normal per-
ceivers in this context. If you’re not normal, then the relevant object might
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instead cause phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions in normal perceivers, in
which case you’re misperceiving its color.
But that is not yet a fully satisfying explanation of color inaccuracy,
because you won’t be capable of misperceiving the color of an object if you’re
a normal perceiver. And that seems wrong. When looking at Kitaoka’s
illusion (Figure 3), normal perceivers will perceive the left square as darker,
and thus seem to misperceive at least one square. Likewise for the other
illusions discussed in Section 4 of “Perceptual Variation and Relativism.”
Another problem with this option is that it doesn’t explain our percep-
tions of color relations. At bottom, the problem is that we’d perceive colors
that are too coarse-grained. Consider again the two squares:
Let’s suppose the phenomenal character of your perception of the left square
is phenomenal-dark-gray, and the phenomenal character of your perception
of the right square is phenomenal-medium-gray. As just noted, the same
objects cause perceptions with different phenomenal characters in different
perceivers. Thus, leaving some distracting qualifications in a footnote, the
right square causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in another normal per-
ceiver.4 As a result, the left square causes a phenomenal-dark-gray perception
in at least one normal perceiver, and the right square causes a phenomenal-
dark-gray perception in at least one normal perceiver. According to the
option we’re considering, phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions thus represent
a color shared by the left and right square. For the same reason, phenomenal-
medium-gray perceptions would represent a color shared by the left and right
square. Thus, according to the option we’re considering, your perceptions of
the squares would leave open the possibility that they’re the same color. More
precisely, you would perceive colors such that it’s possible for both squares
to be exactly the same color. For example, given (2e), you might perceive
4Two qualifications: First, this might not follow if you’re on one of the extremes of
variation within normal perceivers. In that case, we’d just need to refocus the argument
on someone closer to the mean. Second, this might not follow if the variation within
normal perceivers isn’t wide enough. In that case, we’d just need to refocus the argument
on squares that are more similar.
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determinable colors with some of the same determinants (i.e., overlapping
determinables). This is a problem, because you perceive the left square as
darker, and when we perceive one object as darker than another, we’re per-
ceiving them as having incompatible colors, one darker than the other. Thus,
if your perceptions of the squares leaves open the possibility that they’re the
same color, you aren’t perceiving one as darker than the other. Returning
to our analogy from “Perceptual Variation and Relativism,” suppose I tell
you that my son Ian is between 5 and 10 years old, and that my son Isaac
is between 3 and 6 years old. I haven’t thereby told you that Ian is older
than Isaac, because what I’ve said leaves open the possibility that they’re
the same age. To tell you that Ian is older, I have to specify non-overlapping,
and thus incompatible, ranges for each child.
A third option is: a certain perceiver, perhaps a certain normal per-
ceiver, or perhaps an idealized perceiver. The problem is that this is incon-
sistent with perceptual relativism. If Sarah perceives the stone tile as causing
phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in that perceiver, and Jacob perceives the
stone tile as causing phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions in that same per-
ceiver, then at most one of their perceptions is accurate, because the stone
tile can cause a perception with at most one of these phenomenal characters
in the relevant perceiver. Perceptual relativism, however, implies that Sarah
and Jacob can both accurately perceive the stone tile.
5 Other Contexts
According to both of the proposals we considered, you perceive the shaded
region because of a causal relation in that context. What other context might
one appeal to? Once again, it will be helpful to restate this question more
schematically. We’re trying to fill in the following schema:
Proposal 1f: While the shaded region causes a phenomenal-dark-gray
perception in you, you perceive the shaded region as instantiating
causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in you in .
Proposal 2f: While the shaded region causes a phenomenal-dark-gray
perception in you, you perceive the shaded region as instantiating what-
ever property satisfies the description: the property that disposes that
region to cause phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in you in .
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How should we fill in these schema?
One option is: all normal contexts. But this is a non-starter, because
the same object can cause perceptions with different phenomenal characters
in different normal contexts, for example under direct sunlight and under
a shadow. Kitaoka’s illusion is just one example. Thus, nothing causes
phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in all normal contexts.
Another option is: at least one normal context. But then it’s not possible
to misperceive an object’s color in a normal context, because, if an object
causes a phenomenal-dark-gray perception in you in a normal context, you’ll
accurately perceive that object as causing phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions
in you in at least one normal context. However, the illusions we considered in
Section 4 of “Perceptual Variation and Relativism” seem to involve misper-
ception. Moreover, at least some of these illusions seem to occur in normal
contexts. Kitaoka’s illusion is perhaps the most compelling example, because
we normally view objects against white and black backgrounds. It’s possible
to generate similar illusions in other ways. For example, we can make one
object look darker than another, even if they are intrinsically the same, by
varying the lighting, distance, viewing angle, and objects previously seen at
that location. And we normally view objects under dim lighting and bright
lighting, from a few inches away and several feet away, directly ahead of us
and slightly to the side, and after viewing dark objects and bright objects.
This option also has difficulty explaining our perceptions of color rela-
tions. As the illusions in Section 4 demonstrate, almost all objects along the
white-black continuum cause phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in at least
one normal context. We just need to vary the background or lighting. With
this in mind, consider the squares yet again:
The left square is causing a phenomenal-dark-gray perception. Assuming
we make sufficient adjustments to the background and lighting, the right
square will also cause a phenomenal-dark-gray perception. Thus, according
to the option we’re considering, whenever you have a phenomenal-dark-gray
perception, you’re perceiving a color shared by both of these squares. For
the same reason, whenever you have a phenomenal-medium-gray perception,
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you’re perceiving a color shared by both of these squares. But, for the reasons
discussed in the last section, that makes it hard for the atomist to explain
why you perceive the left square as darker.5
A third option is: a certain context, perhaps a certain normal context, or
perhaps an idealized context. In that case, your phenomenal-dark-gray per-
ception of an object is accurate only if that object would cause a phenomenal-
dark-gray perception in you in the specified context. The problem is that
this doesn’t cohere with the motivations for relativism, at least given atom-
ism. Relativism is motivated by the thought that, because we don’t have
any justification for believing that one perceiver rather than another per-
ceiver is accurately perceiving the color of an object, we should say that
both perceivers are accurately perceiving it (for more discussion, see my
manuscript a). Likewise, given atomism, we don’t seem to have any justifi-
cation for believing that one context rather than another context is the place
where our color perceptions are accurate. It would thus be strange for an
atomistic relativist to insist that whenever there’s variation across contexts,
we’re nonetheless accurately perceiving an object’s color in only one of those
contexts. If ignorance is unacceptable with respect to perceivers, it is also
unacceptable with respect to contexts.
A fourth option is to specify a phenomenal character for each context.
For example, if we develop this proposal along the lines of (2f), you perceive
the shaded region as instantiating whatever property satisfies the descrip-
tion: causes a phenomenal-dark-gray perception in this context, causes a
phenomenal-medium-gray perception in that other context, and so on, for
each of the different combinations of illuminants, backgrounds, foregrounds,
distances, and viewing angles. An obvious problem with this option is that
there are so many different combinations of these factors, and thus so many
different contexts, that it’s unclear what grounds all the specifications. In
other words, it’s unclear why you perceive the property that satisfies this de-
scription, rather than another description, such as a description that specifies
a different phenomenal character for just one of the contexts. The proposals
we considered in Section 4 don’t give rise to the same problem, because they
require the specification of only one phenomenal character, namely the phe-
nomenal character of your current perception, and it’s clear what grounds
5Chalmers says that it wouldn’t be “too bad” if our phenomenal-medium-gray per-
ceptions and phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions represented compatible properties (2006,
p.91). But, for the reason mentioned above, I think it would be incompatible with atom-
ism.
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that specification.
This fourth option also makes it hard for you to accurately perceive an
object’s color, because the object’s color would need to satisfy a description
that specifies a phenomenal character for each context, and it’s hard for
the object’s color to satisfy such an elaborate description. As noted in our
discussion of Chalmers’s suggestion, our predictions about how an object will
look under other illuminants are systematically inaccurate. Thus, if what
grounds the specifications is also what’s responsible for these predictions,
an object’s color would rarely satisfy the relevant description, and thus we
wouldn’t perceive it.
Both of these problems also arise if this suggestion is developed along the
lines of (1f), so that the specifications are included in the color itself.
6 Other Relations
Finally, according to both of the proposals we considered, you perceive the
shaded region because of a causal relation. What other relation might one
appeal to?
One suggestion is: a teleological relation. In particular, perhaps phenomenal-
dark-gray perceptions were naturally selected for their ability to indicate a
certain reflectance, and therefore represent that reflectance. The problem
is that natural selection is rarely so specific. Color perceptions as a whole
were plausibly selected for their ability to help us discriminate and identify
objects. But it’s hard to believe that color perceptions of a specific kind,
such as phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions, were selected for their ability to
help us identify a specific kind of object, such as those with a specific re-
flectance. This is a point others have made (e.g., Tye 2006, 2007; Gert
2006, p.579), and I go into more detail in another paper (manuscript a). For
now, I just want to point out that natural selection is especially unhelpful
for the relativist. Natural selection provides explanations that are species-
wide, so that if phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions were naturally selected
for their ability to indicate a certain reflectance, they would represent that
reflectance in everyone, and if phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions were
naturally selected for their ability to indicate a certain other reflectance, they
would represent that other reflectance in everyone. According to the rela-
tivist, Sarah’s phenomenal-dark-gray perception and Jacob’s phenomenal-
medium-gray perception are both accurate perceptions of the stone tile, and
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thus represent compatible properties. Because natural selection is species-
wide, it would follow that your phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions and your
phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions represent compatible properties. But
that makes it hard to explain why, in our example involving two squares, you
perceive the left square as darker than the right square.
Another suggestion is: a phenomenal relation to a color, i.e., a relation
that obtains solely because of the phenomenal character of your perception
(Campbell 1993, Kalderon 2011, and Pautz 2007; see also Chalmers 2006
on Edenic colors). This suggestion is hard to reconcile with relativism.
First, Sarah’s perception and Jacob’s perception have different, incompat-
ible phenomenal characters. If what they perceive is determined solely by
the phenomenal characters of their perceptions, it presumably follows that
they’re perceiving different, incompatible colors. But then at most one of
their perceptions can be accurate, contrary to relativism. Moreover, if they
are perceiving compatible colors, despite the difference in their phenomenal
characters (as Kalderon 2007 suggests), then any pair of perceptions with
the same phenomenal characters would also be perceptions of compatible
colors, including your perception of the squares from the last subsection.
But that makes it hard to explain why you perceive the left square as darker.
Second, it would be hard to explain color constancy, such as when you per-
ceive the sphere as the same color despite the phenomenal differences due
to the shadow. If what we perceive is determined solely by the phenomenal
characters of our perceptions, it presumably follows that you’re perceiving a
constant color only if there is a constant phenomenal character included in
all your perceptions of the sphere’s regions. And, as I argued earlier, I don’t
think there is any such phenomenal character.
We’re now in a position to appreciate the general problem with appeal-
ing to other relations mentioned in “Perceptual Variation and Relativism”:
Whereas causal relations can vary from person to person, these other rela-
tions are usually unvarying across the entire population. As a result, ap-
pealing to these other relations can make it hard for the relativist to explain
how Sarah’s phenomenal-dark-gray perception of the stone tile and Jacob’s
phenomenal-medium-gray perception can both be accurate, without thereby
implying that your phenomenal-dark-gray perception of the left square and
your phenomenal-medium-gray perception of the right square are insufficient
for perceiving the left square as darker. If Sarah’s and Jacob’s perceptions
are both accurate, they’re perceiving compatible colors, and if your percep-
tions are accurate, you’re perceiving incompatible colors.
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7 Conclusion
Perceptual atomism is a big tent, and there are a staggering number of vari-
ants. It would be impossible to consider all of them. But I can’t find a variant
that’s compatible with perceptual relativism and that avoids the problems
just mentioned. For this reason, I think that a perceptual relativist should
give up perceptual atomism and look for an alternative. I suggest perceptual
structuralism (see my forthcoming a).
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